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BASTARDS-REQUIREMENTS FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT
IN NEBRASKA

A truck driver, in the presence of a competent witness, signed
an application for employment in Nebraska in which he stated
that he had two sons dependent upon him for support, and named
the sons. The driver was later killed in an auto accident, and
in a wrongful death action the question arose as to whether the
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application was a sufficient acknowledgment under the Nebraska
statutes1 to legitimate the sons who were concededly born out of
wedlock. Held :2 reversing on rehearing a prior opinion3 on the
same facts, that the writing was sufficient to meet the tests of
the statute. The result is at last a definitive statement of the
Nebraska court's attitude concerning the problem of legitimation,
and is in accord with the prevailing liberal view of treatment of
children born out of wedlock.
Section 30-109 has been construed to require proof of three
facts: (1) that the child was born out of wedlock; (2) that the
alleged father was in fact the real father; and (3) that the
father has acknowledged the child in the terms of the statute.4
In the instant case, it was conceded that facts (1) and (2) had
been proved, 13 but it was asserted that the application did not constitute sufficient acknowledgment.
In two early Nebraska cases it was decided that the statutory provision established two requirements for the acknowledgment: (1) it must be one in which the paternity is directly, unequivocally, and unquestionably acknowledged; and (2) the writing must be in and of itself sufficient, unaided by extrinsic evidence, to establish the paternity. 6 In light of this statement, it
would seem that the writing must show on its face that the child
was born out of wedlock; that the alleged father actually was
the real father, and that the father acknowledged the child. In
the first hearing on the instant case, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the application form was not an express, unequivocal and unquestionable acknowledgment of the paternity of

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-109 (Reissue 1948), insofar as it is pertinent,
provides: "Every child born out of wedlock shall be considered as an
heir of the person who shall, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness. have acknowledged himself to be the father of the
child. . . . " This statute has remained virtually the same since Nebraska
became a state in 1867, the only change being that before 1943 the firs~
phrase read "Every illegitimate child," instead of "Every child born out
of wedlock." See Neb. Comp. Stat. § 30-109 (1929); Neb. Comp. Stat.
§ 1228 (1922); Neb. Comp. Stat. §1273 (1913); Neb. Rev. Stat. c. 14, §
31, p. 62 (1867).
2 Peetz v. Jllasek Auto Supply Co., 161 Neb. 588, 74 N.W.2d 474 (1956).
3 Peetz v. Masek Auto Supply Co., 160 Neb. 410, 70 N.W.2d 482 (1955) .
.i In Re Estate of Oakley, 149 Neb. 556, 31 N.W.2d 557 (1948).
Ii Brief of Appellant. p. 27, Peetz v. Masek Auto Supply Co., 161 Neb.
588, 74 N.W.2d 474 (1956).
o Moore v. Flack, 77 Neb. 52, 108 N.W. 143 (1906); Lind v. Burke, 56
Neb. 785, 77 N.W. 444 (1898).
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the children.7 On rehearing, however, the court held that the application was one in which the paternity was directly, unequivocally and unquestionably acknowledged. The court also overruled
the requirement that the writing must be in and of itself sufficient, without extrinsic evidence, to establish paternity.
Whether one believes the court's latest interpretation of section 30-109, setting a liberal standard for acknowledgment, was
progressive depends in large part upon one's values; but it is submitted, as will be explained later, that the court was correct in
holding that this application for employment was a sufficient acknowledgment. The decision is equally as noteworthy in that the
7 The construction of the Nebraska statute could have been avoided in
the instant case. The truck driver, his wife and the illegitimate children
were all domiciled in Iowa at the time of the accident and had been for
some time prior to the driver's death. There is a wide split of authority
as to which law governs the attainment of the status of legitimacy. See,
e.g., Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 137 (2d ed. 1938); 2 Beale, Conflict of
Laws §§ 139.1-140.1 (1935); 1 Wharton. Conflict of Laws §§ 240-248
(1905); Story, Conflict of Laws § 93 (1834); Annot., 162 A.L.R. 626
(1946); Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945); Wolf v.
Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346 (1916); Hall v. Gabbert, 213 Ill.
208, 72 N.E. 806 (1904); Franklin v. Lee, 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N.E. 78
(1901). The better rule would appear to apply Iowa law to determine
whether the children were legitimate. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§
137-140 (1934); McNamara v. McNamara, 303 Ill. 191, 135 N.E. 410
(1922), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 734 (1922). Under the Nebraska Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-12,101 to
25-12,107 (Reissue 1948), the Nebraska courts will take judicial notice
of the laws of all other jurisdictions in the United States, but the court
has the right to require that such law be pleaded, even though it need not
be proved. The Nebraska Supreme Court does require foreign law to be
pleaded. Smith v. Brooks, 154 Neb. 93, 47 N.W.2d 389 (1951); Scott v.
Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951). In the instant case, it appears that counsel for the illegitimates did not plead the Iowa law but
sought to amend the pleadings at the trial to do so. The trial court agreed
on the condition that counsel submit to a continuance to allow the defendant to prepare on the matter. This offer was rejected by the plaintiff's counsel, and the court would not allow Iowa law to be pleaded. See
Brief for Appellee in Support of Motion for Rehearing, p, 7, and Supplemental Brief for Appellant, p. 10, Peetz v. Masek Auto Supply Co., 161
Neb. 588, 74 N.W.2d 474 (1956). The Iowa legitimation statute, so far
as pertinent, provides: "They [illegitimates] shall inherit from the father
when . . . they have been recognized by him as his children; but such
recognition must have been general and notorious, or else in writing."
Iowa Code § 646.46 (1950). The application for employment in the instant case, coupled with other evidence of recognition brought out at the
trial. would seem clearly to have legitimated the children under Iowa law.
See Re Estate of Wulf, 242 Iowa 1012, 48 N.W.2d 890 (1951); Trier v.
Singmaster, 184 Iowa 307, 167 N.W. 538 (1918); Luce v. Tompkins, 177
Iowa 168, 158 N.W. 535 (1916).
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rejection of the "no extrinsic evidence" test should serve to eliminate a great deal of confusion in Nebraska law governing legitimation.
The "no extrinsic evidence" rule was first advanced in Lind

v. Bu1•ke,8 but since no writing was introduced to prove acknowledgment in that case, the statement was dictum. 9 Nonetheless,
in Moore v. Flack,1° another case in which no writing was introduced to prove acknowledgment, the rule was reiterated. The test
was not explained in either case. Thomas v. Estate of Thomas, 11
decided in the interim period between the Lind and Moore cases,
appears to have destroyed any reasoning which might have supported the rule, and this fact was recognized by the court at the
rehearing in the instant case. The Thomas case, depending heavily
on Blythe v. Ayres,12 a California case construing a statute quite
similar to Nebraska's,13 held that no intent to make the child an
heir was required by the statute. It further held that the writing
need not mention the illegitimacy of the child or that it had been
witnessed, and the witness did not have to attest the writing. As
56 Neb. 785, 77 N.W. 444 (1898).
In the Lind case, the evidence adduced was the statement of a railroad agent that he wrote a letter for Lind, in English. which would assist
Lind's alleged child in getting from New York to Central City. The writing was not introduced at the trial, and only the statement of the agent
showed the paternity. The court stated in the syllabus that the evidence
was insufficient to permit a claim of heirship.
10 77 Neb. 582, 108 N.W. 143 (1906).
No writing was introduced in
ihe Moore case, but the deposition of a county judge who had presided at
a paternity action in which Moore was found to be the father of the
plaintiff stated that the judge thought that Moore had acknowledged the
plaintiff during the course of that action. .Another party testified by
deposition that he had delivered a note from Moore to the mother of the
child, and the note had said, "Take good care of our boy and call him
Thomas Moore, and I will give him a good start some day." The court
held that such testimony was not conclusive in the absence of any writing
in court.
11 64 Neb. 581, 90 N.W. 630 ,1902).
No writing was produced in the
Thomu.s case, but a witness testified that the father and mother had drawn
an agreement stating "That John D. Thomas, the party of the first part,
hereby acknowledges himself to be the father of Frank P. Thomas, the
child born to Martha Haight," and that the witness had seen Thomas sign
the writing. The trial court had held that this was not a sufficient acknowledgment, but the supreme court reversed, holding that it was a
question of fact for the jury.
1:! 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915 (1892). In the Blythe case, letters written
by Blythe to his child and to her grandfather, signed in the presence of
a witness, actually were introduced in evidence.
13 "Every illegitimate child is an heir of any person who. in writing,
signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be
the father of such child." Cal. CiY. Code § 1387 (1872).
S

9
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a necessary concomitant of this holding, extrinsic evidence would
have to be introduced to show illegitimacy, and to prove that the
writing was witnessed. Thus the "no extrinsic evidence" rule
seems to have been neatly emasculated, but the Moore case, although accepting the statement in Thomas that no intent to make
the child an heir was necessary, adhered to the rule.

Van Hove v. Van Hove, 14 the next case, in point of time, to
construe the statute, stated that since it was not proved that the
alleged father was the father of the illegitimate child, a writing
which failed to state that the father was the actual father of the
child and which was not shown to have been signed in the presence
of a witness did not satisfy the terms of the statute. This case
appears to have revived the "no extrinsic evidence" rule, but In
Re Estate of Winslow,1 5 upon which the instant decision is based,
held that once paternity is clearly established, a letter with only
a modicum of evidence showing the paternal relationship was sufficient acknowledgment. Until the decision in the instant case
the law on this point has been most confused, as the apparent inconsistencies in their various holdings had not been given any explanation by the court. The instant case, by eliminating the rule,
should also eliminate the confusion.
From the dross of these conflicting decisions, the essence of
the rule in the instant case can be refined ; that when illegitimacy
and proof of paternity are established, almost any writing which
indicates that the father recognizes the child as his, no matter
what its form, content, or the intent behind it, will be held to be
sufficient acknowledgment. Following the lead of the Blythe,
Thomas, and Winslow cases, the court seems to have accepted the
policy that the only strictness involved should be in proof of
paternity, and once that is satisfactorily established, courts "should
lean strongly in favor of a finding that the father of an illegitimate child has done what every honest and humane man should
be not only willing, but eager to do, and what a just law would
compel the unwilling to do." 1 6
14 94 Neb. 575, 143 N.W. 815 (1913), aff'd on rehearing, 96 Neb. 484,
148 N.W. 152 (1915). The writing in the Van Hove case was a statement
contained in a record of marriage contracted in Belgium, and stated "The
above named husband and wife agreed taking as their lawful children, and
to recognize them as such (naming plaintiff and other childen) . • • ."
This was introduced in evidence.
15 115 Neb. 553, 213 N.W. 819 (1927).
The writings were letters
written by Winslow to his daughter, and were addressed in the saluation
as "Dear Daughter," or "Dear Daughter and Children." and were signed
"Your loving father." These were introduced in evidence.
16 Blythe v . .Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 589, 31 Pac. 915, 926 (1892).
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It is often stated that legitimation statutes should be strictly
construed,17 in order that a stranger to an intestate's blood would
be unable to gain any part of the intestate's property. But if
strict proof of paternity is required, this concern is obviated, and
under the rule set out in the instant case, the father is aided in
carrying out what he recognizes as a moral duty to the child and
to society. The present rule seems in accord both with prevailing
judicial policy and other Nebraska policy in regard to illegitimate
children.
In most states one of two kinds of statutes is usually enacted
to provide for legitimation.18 One type provides that the acknowledgment must be in writing, and the other type requires only
that the recognition be open and notorious. In those states which
require recognition in writing, the statutes generally are liberally
construed,19 and it is usually held that there need be no intent
shown by the writing to make the child an heir.
Both those states which require writing and those which do
not would seem to require that there must be proof of paternity
and proof of illegitimacy.20 The writing and the open and notorious recognition are merely two different means to achieve the
same end the requirement of a writing being the more rigid standard. Since the policy behind both types of statutes is the same,
the mere fact of a writing should suffice, without the requirement
of a formal document.
Especially in wrongful death actions, 21 such as was involved
in the instant case, where no question of the inheritance of property is involved, but rather where the negligent actor is sought to
be held accountable for his wrong doing, the present rule is a wise
one. Society benefits from having the negligent actor, rather
than the public as a whole, bear the burden of supporting the
children if they are dependent.
17 Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F2d 464 (10th Cir. 1930); Estate of Paterson.
34 Cal. App.2d 305, 93 P.2d 825 (1939); In re Riemann's Estate, 124 Kan.
539, 262 Pac. 16 (1927).
lSSee Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 705 (1954).
w See Wall v. Altobello, 49 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1950); Barber v. Barber,
198 Okla. 520, 180 P.2d 658 (1947); In re Winslow's Estate, 115 Neb. 553,
213 N.W. 319 (1927); Erickson v. Erickson's Estate, 191 Iowa 1393, 180
N.W. 664 (1920); In re Loyd's Estate, 170 Cal. 85, 148 Pac. 522 (1915);
Thomas v. Thomas' Estate, 64 Neb. 581, 90 N.W. 630 (1902); Blythe v.
Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915 (1892).
20 Ibid.
21 See Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934);
Withrow v. Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S.E.2d 343 (1943), cert. denied,
320 u.s. 761 (1943).
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Nebraska has shown itself to favor legitimacy in several instances. In all marriages which terminate in annulment or divorce, save only those where consanguinity or miscegenation are
involved, the termination of the marital relationship has no effect
upon the legitimacy of the children.22 And children born of a marriage relationship are to be treated as legitimate even though born
so soon after marriage that it is a certainty that conception occurred before marriage.23 Thus Nebraska, by both legislative and
judicial decision, and again in the instant case, has demonstrated
an awareness of the humane concept that the onus for the act of
the parent cannot justly be placed upon the child, and that the
policy of visiting the sins of fathers upon helpless children no
longer expresses our prevailing views of justice.
James W. Hewitt, '56

22

23

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-325 through 42-328 (Reissue 1952).
Hudson v. Hudson, 151 Neb. 210, 36 N;W.2d 851 (1949).

